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ARE SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS PENALLY RESPONSIBLE
FOR OBEYING SUPERIOR ORDERS WHICH DIRECT
COMMISSION OF CRIME?
BY MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO*
To what extent, if at all, should soldiers or subordinate officials be
responsible for criminal acts committed under orders of a higher authority?
This question, together with that of penal liability for aggressive war, engaged
the attention of the Nuremberg courts following World War II, as it has
been a matter for intense debate ever since the military came under scrutiny
and adjudication for acts which extended beyond the scope of pure military
offense and defense.
It will be recalled that at the end of the American Civil War, Captain
Henry Wirz, commandant of the Confederate Prison at Andersonville,
Georgia, was tried for maltreatment of federal soldiers and his defense was
that the acts of brutality attributed to him were the result of orders forced
upon him by superior rank. In the few trials which occurred after World
War I, where German soldiers and sailors were charged with shooting
civilians and machine-gunning survivors of torpedoed ships, their invariable
defense was superior orders. It was inevitable then that when Adolf Eich-
mann was brought before a tribunal in Israel, charged with having caused
the deaths of millions of Jews, his defense would be that to whatever extent
he participated in the genocidal program he was immune from prosecution
because he was under orders of the head of the State. He conceded on the
witness stand that the massacre of unarmed and unoffending populations was
"one of the most hideous crimes in the history of mankind." He explained:
"I regarded this violent solution of the Jewish problem as something hideous
and heinous," but he lifted the shield of assumed immunity with the statement:
"I was compelled to do what I did because of my oath of loyalty and
allegiance."
* Senior Justice, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; B.A. and M.A., George Washington
University; LL.B., Georgetown University; LL.M. and Master of Patent Laws,
National University; Doctor of Juristic Science, American University; Doctor of Juris-
prudence, University of Rome; served as President Judge, Tribunal II, International
War Crimes Trials, Nuremberg; author, AFTER TWELVE YEARS, LISTEN TO THE RIVER,
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THE WAR IN ITALY, TEN DAYS TO DIE, ACROSS THE STREET FROM THE COURTHOUSE,
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It was on account of this anticipated defense of superior orders by Eich-
mann that the Israeli government invited me to testify at the trial in Jeru-
salem. As a judge at Nuremberg I had presided over the Einsatzgruppen
trial, which was called by the Associated Press "the biggest murder trial
in history."' The defense of the twenty-three defendants in that case, who
were under indictment for having murdered one million civilians, was also
that of superior orders. Thus, I had been called upon to rule on the very
question which was now confronting the Israeli court.
At the trial in Jerusalem I related how one of the defendants in the
Einsatzgruppen case, an SS Colonel Willy Seibert, had declared in his defense
that Kaiser Wilhelm I or II had proclaimed that if a military situation
made it necessary, a soldier would have to shoot his own parents if ordered
to do so. After Seibert had quoted this authority, I asked him from the
bench what he would do if he were ordered to shoot his own father and
mother. Much to the surprise of everyone in the courtroom he replied that
he could not answer the question. The faces of his codefendants in the dock
dropped. "Why, you idiot," they seemed to say, "that is our whole defense."
Of course, it was quite evident that Seibert had demurred because he saw
that he had placed himself on the horns of a double dilemma. If he said
he would shoot his parents he feared he would make of himself, in the eyes of
the tribunal, something less than human, and if he replied that he would refuse
to obey the order, he would be abandoning his defense of mandatory superior
orders.
I insisted that he answer the question because it was he who had intro-
duced the subject. He equivocated and rambled, fighting in his mind a delaying
action, as he sought to extricate himself from the trap he had sprung on him-
self. When I demanded a straightforward answer he finally said:
"In my opinion this declaration was made in order to create an im-
pression."
"But not to be obeyed literally ?"
"That depends on the circumstances."
"Well, let us suppose a case where your superior officers tell you that
the situation is such that the only way you can get out of it is for you
to shoot your parents. Now that's an order. All right, now, are you going to
live up to William the First or William the Second, or not ?"
"In this situation it would have to be obeyed, your Honor."
"You would shoot your parents if the situation required it."
"Insofar as I would have my psychological reaction, and I do not know
whether based on this psychological reaction I carry out the order which has
to be obeyed or whether I subject myself to punishment."
1. Associated Press Disptach, April 10, 1948.
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"Now you must answer the question. If the military situation is such
that the only way you can be saved, according to what your officer tells you,
is to shoot your parents, will you shoot them or not?"
"I cannot answer such a question, your Honor, in such a short time.
That is such a psychological struggle that I am not in a position to say yes
or no."
I allowed him until the next day to reflect. The following morning he
returned to the witness stand, his features drawn, his eyes ringed red, in-
evitable signs of a sleepless night. I repeated the question of the day before.
He stared straight ahead, obviously afraid of what his codefendants might
think, and, then with an attitude of one who wants to get something un-
pleasant over as quickly as possible, replied: "Mr. President, I would not do
so.',
The audience broke into excited whispering and agitated elbow-prodding.
The defendants' dock heaved a collective, heavy grunt of disgust. After
gaveling for order I put another question: "Suppose the order came down
for you to shoot the parents of someone else, let us say, a Jew and his wife.
The children are standing by and they implore you not to shoot their parents.
Will you do so?"
Seibert clutched at the edge of the witness stand and gasped: "Your
Honor, I would not shoot these parents."
2
Thus, what had begun as a demonstration of the absolute subserviency
of a subordinate to superior orders ended with a declaration that a German
soldier could and would refuse to respond to an order his conscience con-
demned.
Eichmann's attorney, Dr. Robert Servatius, argued at the trial in Israel
that if his client had resisted the Jewish extermination order he would have
incurred the death penalty. When I was on the witness stand, the Israeli
Attorney General Gideon Hausner asked me whether the Nuremberg trials
revealed that any soldier or officer had been shot for refusing to kill Jews.
In my reply, I referred to the case of Mathias Graf who was one of the
defendants in the Einsatzgruppen case. The evidence established that al-
though this man had been ordered to kill Jews, he managed to circumvent
the order. Upon this evidence I acquitted him and he walked out of the
courtroom a free man.3 I also told of the case of Lieutenant Colonel Gustav
Nosske who, after his Einsatzgruppen tour of duty, was routed to Dusseldorf,
Germany, where he was ordered to shoot all Jews and half-Jews in that
2. Record, pp. 2460-2686, United States v. Ohlendorf (Einsatzgruppen Case),
Tribunal II, Case No. 9 (Nuremberg 1948).




area. Nosske protested the order because, he explained, he could not bring
himself to kill anyone who had at least one German parent. Although
Nosske suffered some inconveniences because of his unwillingness to shoot
half-Jews, he was not shot or even degraded.
4
I introduced documentary evidence on other Einsatzgruppen defendants
who, although they had, for a period, killed Jews under orders, eventually
inwardly rebelled at the inhuman slaughter and requested transfer to other
work and duties, and they were in fact so reassigned. One of the defendants,
Erwin Schulz, asked to be relieved from his command in the Einsatzgruppen,
and he was relieved.5 I made it clear in my testimony, however, that these
individuals, who were released from complying with the extermination order,
were excused not because their superior officers felt sorry for them, but
because the protesting subordinates impeded the work of others who were
perfectly willing, ready and able to shoot down in cold blood unarmed men,
women and children. It was a matter of stark efficiency, not compassion,
which caused the reassignment.
At the termination of the Einsatzgruppen trial in Nuremberg I sentenced
fourteen of the defendants to death and nine others to varying terms of
imprisonment because the evidence established beyond any doubt whatever (not
merely beyond a reasonable doubt) that, in conducting their horrible mas-
sacres they agreed with the so-called superior orders and zestfully cooperated
with their superiors in accomplishing the extermination of what they regarded
an inferior race.
When the decision in the Einsatzgruppen case was publicly announced,
Representative George A. Dondero of Michigan attacked in Congress that
part of my Opinion in which I declared that subordinates in rank were
required to obey only lawful orders. "Follow the implications of this state-
ment through to a logical conclusion," Dondero taunted. "In effect, it
encourages mass disobedience of superior officers within our armed forces.
Implied therein is the threat that if the forces of international communism
are victorious, ruthless vengeance will be meted out to those who dare to
defend their own country and its interests."6
Mr. Dondero's observations and criticism rose from inadequate and
faulty knowledge of the facts. I cast aside at once his irrelevant comment
as to what the "forces of international communism" would do, because,
having observed what international communism has done in all parts of the
world, we know that those "forces," in the event of conflict, would not be
guided by law in any event. But whiat Congressman Dondero failed to appre-
4. Id. at 558-59.
5. Id. at 519.
6. 94 CONG. REc. A-2369 (1948).
[Vol. 67
SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS
ciate is that while a soldier's first duty is to obey, it is also rudimentary
common sense that his obedience is not that of an automaton. A soldier
is a reasoning agent. He does not respond, and is not supposed to respond
to an order which directs him to commit murder. General J. Lawton Collins,
Chief of Staff of the United States Army, excellently put the matter when
he said:
Discipline in our army cannot be founded upon a mechanical and
uninquiring subservience, but instead must have as its keynote a
respect for the rights and responsibilities of the individual.'
In behalf of his continuing thesis, Congressman Dondero printed in
the Congressional Record a letter in which the writer, after quoting from my
Opinion, said with heavy sarcasm:
Who is to say whether or not the given order is lawful? Is the sub-
ordinate required to go back to his bunk, look up the law on the
subject, and if he believes the order is not lawful, so report back
to his superior and decline to obey. . . . Imagine if during a crisis,
instead of instantly obeying to the best of his ability, the buck private
or gob would go leisurely to his cot and there read Blackstone on
the particular subject.
He ended his letter with a recommendation that the judges in Nuremberg
read Tennyson's "Charge of the Light Brigade."
The writer's hypotheses on buck privates and gobs find no confirmation
in the Einsatzgruppen case where the convicted defendants were all com-
missioned officers holding high rank and thoroughly familiar with, as well
as entirely in accord with, the criminal scope of the tasks they set out to
perform.
The reference to Tennyson's "Charge of the Light Brigade" introduced
a picture which could in no manner of comparison fit into the Einsatzgruppen
frame. In war, the concept of unquestioning obedience, as lyricized in poetry,
romance and fiction, has always revolved around some mortal risk assumed
by the obedient soldier. It is traditional in those heroic episodes that the
soldier goes forth unflinchingly to perform his duty knowing that his chances
of returning alive are wrapped in bomb explosion and gunpowder smoke.
Such was the setting of Tennyson's glorious verse. But the Einsatzgruppen
defendants, many of whom, by a twist of ironic fate, were operating in that
same Crimea where, a hundred years before, Cardigan's Cavalry charged the
Russian batteries, never faced the dilemma which confronted the British Light
Brigade at Balaklava. The Einsatz battalions were not "stormed at with shot
and shell," they were not ordered into the "jaws of death," they did not flash
"sabres bare" as they galloped into the mouths of cannon.
7. This Week, Feb. 12, 1950, p. 1.
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The Einsatzgruppen soldiers were not commanded to oppose cannon
or bayonets. They were summoned to shoot down unarmed, helpless men;
they were directed to fire at fright-crazed harmless women; they were called
upon to aim rifles at sobbing, weeping children. No soldier would be dis-
graced in asking to be excused from so one-sided a battle. No soldier could
be accused of cowardice in seeking relief from a duty which, in verity, was
not a soldier's duty at all. No soldier or officer attempting to evade such
a task would be pleading avoidance of a military obligation. He would simply
be requesting not to be made a criminal assassin. And if the leaders of the
Einsatzgruppen had all expressed their unwillingness to play the odious parts
assigned to them, that black page of million-mouth massacre in German
history would not have been written.
One of the reasons why SS volunteers willingly accepted the Einsatz-
gruppen assignment, instead of fighting the enemy at the front, was that
when they fired at helpless men, women and children, no one fired back.
Some of the defendants at Nuremberg said that they did not agree with
the extermination order, but they were powerless to evade its execution. In
those instances it became important to ascertain whether the asserted oppo-
sition was factual or was only conjured up as a defense at the trial. SS
Colonel Walter Blume was one defendant who testified that he did not like
to kill Jews. Yet he testified that before every execution he made a speech
to his men in which he declared:
As such it is no job for German men and soldiers to shoot defense-
less people, but the Fuehrer has ordered these shootings because he
is convinced that these men otherwise would shoot at us as partisans
or would shoot at our comrades, and our women and children were
also to be protected if we undertake this execution.
8
There was no proof or even the slightest intimation that the victims,
who lived a thousand miles from Germany, might at some time in the in-
definite future shoot at German women and children. Blume said that he
made his speeches to the men to ease their feelings, but actually he was
convincing them how proper and justifiable it was to kill innocent and
defenseless human beings. If he had really believed the order to be unjust,
conscience would at least have restrained him from falsely defending it on
the basis of justice and reasonableness. His exhortations may well have
persuaded his men into the enthusiastic accomplishment of other executions
which might otherwise have been avoided entirely or less completely fulfilled.
It was suggested to Blume that he might have avoided the ordered mas-
8. Record, pp. 1788-89, United States v. Ohlendorf (Einsatzgruppen Case), Tri-
bunal II, Case No. 9 (Nuremberg 1948).
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sactes simply by sending in false reports, but he said that such falsification
would have been unworthy of him. Then as an afterthought he added:
Apart from this my personal attitude about giving a false report,
it would have been discovered very soon and it would have brought
the same results as an open refusal to obey, namely, my sentence to
death.
I asked which of the two reasons motivated him to kill rather than to
falsify. He said that he didn't know which thought dominated at the time.
I insisted on an answer:
These two reasons can't be reconciled. It is like a person who must
decide whether to steal a hundred dollars or not and a conflict
arises in his mind: "If I steal this money I am being dishonest
and I would not be true to myself; it is not correct, and it is not
moral-that is one reason. And then, for the second reason, I may
get caught and they might send me to jail."
Of course, the second reason would completely nullify the first, because
in the latter case he would not be debating the problem morally; his concern
would only be that he might "be caught." Blume seemed offended with the
illustration. He sat up erectly, squared his shoulders, and announced with
emphasis that "the feeling that a false report was unworthy of me induced
me not to take such a way out."
His reply is an interesting one for reflection. The man who must decide
between honor with sacrifice and dishonor without sacrifice would prefer
naturally not to be forced into choosing between such alternatives. But no
one can be assured, in the complexities of life, that he will not be required
to make momentous decisions. Blume had a choice between the physical
fact of murder and the abstract concept of equivocation. He had to decide
which was more honorable: to write up a report stating that a thousand men,
women and children had been killed although they still lived, or to take these
helpless creatures out into the woods, shoot them down pitilessly and fling
them into graves with the possibility that some of them might still be alive.
Blume's further testimony revealed, however, that his involved expla-
nations were merely a mask to cover his real feelings because before he left
the witness stand he said that he "adored" and "worshipped" Hitler, and
that whatever Hitler ordered was right. He asserted that Hitler "had a
great mission for the German people." It did not matter to him what this
mission might mean to the rest of mankind, and thus, he voluntarily took
the Fuehrer oath:
I vow inviolable fidelity to Adolf Hitler; I vow absolute obedience
to him and to the leaders he designates for me.
1963]
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By this voluntary and absolute submission of will to Hitler, Blume
wiped out the defense of superior orders. When anyone willingly abdicates
all independent thinking and tenders himself as putty into the hands of an-
other, he cannot complain if he is punished for the crimes plotted and
planned by the other with whom he stands inviolably in agreement. For
it must be obvious that Hitler with all his cunning and unmitigated evil would
have roamed the streets and alleys of Austria and Germany as innocuous
as a rambling crank if he had not had a hundred thousand Blumes to do his
bidding. Blume, in reality, was not a subordinate of Hitler, he was an alter
ego of Hitler, he was a coconspirator, and here we come to the very heart
of the subject of superior orders.
The lawyers defending Field Marshall Keitel and Colonel General Jodl
before the International Military Tribunal argued that their clients were
not responsible for the atrocities they directed since they were merely obeying
the superior orders of Hitler. The Tribunal rejected this contention: "Su-
perior orders, even to a soldier, cannot be considered in mitigation where
crimes as shocking and extensive have been committed consciously, ruth-
lessly, and without military excuse or justification."9 Also, "Participation
in such crimes as these have never been required of any soldier and he
cannot now shield himself behind a mythical requirement of soldierly
obedience." 10
In approving this decision the famous author Rebecca West observed
with acidulous wit: "It is obvious that if an admiral were ordered by a
demented First Sea Lord to serve broiled babies in the officers' mess he
ought to disobey it.""
What concept is embraced in the phrase "superior officer" when we
deliberate on the duty the subordinate owes to obey him? Superiority is not
confined to rank. Superiority inevitably must include also the capacity to
compel and coerce. It could happen, for instance, in a criminal operation
that the captain guides the major. In such case the captain could not expect
exoneration on the theory that he was under the domination of the major.
When the mental and moral capacities of the superior and subordinate are
pooled in the planning and execution of a criminal act, the subordinate may
not plead in his defense that he was forced into the performance of what
he helped to plan.
No officer or soldier in the SS could honestly say that he was unaware
of the Nazi program against Jewry. As early as February, 1920, the National
9. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 291 (1947).
10. Id. at 325.
11. WEST, A TRAIN OF POWDER 48 (1955).
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Socialist Party announced in its twenty-five-point program, which never
changed, its unrelenting hostility to Jews in every field of individual and
social activity. Mein Kampf was dedicated to the doctrine of Aryan supe-
riority. Der Stuermer and other publications spread the verbal poison of
race hatred. Nazi leaders everywhere vilified the Jews, holding them up to
public ridicule and contempt. In November, 1938, an SS-inspired and
organized hoodlumism fell upon the Jews of Germany: synagogues were de-
stroyed, prominent Jews were arrested and imprisoned, a collective fine of
one billion marks was imposed. Eichmann and the Nuremberg defendants
knew all these things. Could they then express surprise when, after this un-
broken, mounting program of destructive violence, plans were formulated for
the "final solution of the Jewish problem ?"
Could Eichmann and the Einsatzgruppen defendants profess ignorance
of the illegality of the extermination order? The sailor who voluntarily ships
on a pirate craft may not be heard to answer that he did not expect he
would be called upon to rob and sink other vessels. He who willingly embarks
on an illegal enterprise is charged with the natural unfolding of that unlawful
undertaking.
It was argued by Dr. Servatius and by the German lawyers in my court
in Nuremberg that even if a subordinate realizes that the act he is called
upon to perform is a crime, he should not be punished if he commits the
crime in order to avoid serious consequences to himself. What would be
the serious consequences? Certainly if the penalty for failure to execute a
criminal order would be insignificant, in comparison to the fate to be visited
upon the innocent victim, the doer cannot plead superior orders in his defense.
For instance, if a soldier is threatened with a year's imprisonment if he
does not shoot down an innocent child, he cannot shoot the child and expect
to escape punishment because he was saving himself from an unmerited
year's imprisonment. The child, in this hypothetical case, would be as much
entitled to its life as the soldier was entitled to his year's freedom.
The defendants in the Einsatzgruppen case, however, were not charged
with killing one child but thousands of children. Aside from any written law,
they had the natural duty, the obligation to society, the bounded responsi-
bility to divine justice to make every effort to avoid massacring the innocents.
Killings by the Einsatzgruppen defendants were not a matter of a day's
business. It was a continuing business, day after day, week after week, and
month after month. The objective was to kill off all the Jews until there were
no more Jews. No kind of a superior order could justify so monstrous a
program.
If killers engaged in such an operation could find an excuse for killing
a thousand babies today, and a thousand tomorrow, and a third thousand the
1963]
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day after tomorrow, the time would have to come when the excuse would
not avail, no matter what might be the punishment. Again it must be repeated
that the innocent thousands have as much right to live as the executioner,
and only a world made up of imbeciles and idiots could allow a mass murderer
to go on killing off the population simply because he feared that if he did
not fill the rivers with blood he himself would suffer disconcerting conse-
quences. A mass murderer, in such a situation, has a duty which cannot be
excused under any circumstances, to fight against continued murdering.
Justice Moshe Landau spoke wisely and justly when, in sentencing Adolf
Eichmann, he said:
Even had we found that the Accused acted out of blind obedience, as
he alleges, we would still have said that one who had participated in
crimes of such dimensions, for years on end, must undergo the
greatest punishment known to the Law, and no order given to him
could be a ground even for mitigating his punishment.
The Court then added:
But in fact we have found that in acting as he did, the Accused
identified himself in his heart with the orders received by him and
was actuated by an ardent desire to attain the criminal objective.
12
Thus, it is patently clear that the murderer may not plead innocence
even if the murder he commits is ordered by a superior officer, when it is
clear that he is in accord with the principle and the objective aimed at by
the criminal act. When the will of the doer merges with the will of the
superior in the execution of the illegal act, the doer has lost all right to plead
coercion under superior orders.
Colonel Werner Braune at the Einsatzgruppen trial testified that he
entertained "inner misgivings" about shooting unresisting civilians. However,
he presented no objective testimony to prove that reluctance. If he was really
acting under compulsion and deplored the killings (in one massacre he
directed the killing of 10,000 Jews and gypsies) it is reasonable to suppose
that he would have wanted, whenever the opportunity presented itself, to
save some hapless intended victim if, for no other reason than to be enabled,
later on, to give substance to his contention that he was morally opposed to
the extermination order. I asked him if he had at any time released "some
defenseless woman or whimpering child of the Jewish faith, who was sched-
uled for execution?"
He said he had not. I gave him time to search his memory and then
later asked him: "Did you not, in complying with that order, attempt to




salve your conscience by releasing one single individual human creature of
the Jewish race-man, woman, or child ?"
He was as constant as a professor of geology. "Your Honor, there were
no exceptions, and I did not see any possibility."
But was this credible? Braune was separated from the bastions on the
Rhine by mountains, lakes, rivers, forests, vast plains, countless cities and
millions of people. He would have encountered no difficulties if he had taken
a boy or girl by the hand and led him or her away from the execution pits,
if only he might be able to say in later years, in the event Hitler's boast for
a thousand-year Reich should go awry, that he did have "inner misgivings"
about the Fuehrer-Order and that on one occasion he did save a dirty-faced,
whimpering child.
The real truth was that Braune, like Adolf Eichmann, had no interest
in saving Jewish children. In Eichmann's memoirs dictated in Argentina,
and presented at his trial in Israel, he told of attending an Einsatzgruppen
massacre where a woman holding a child in her arms pleaded with him to
save the child from the doom she and the hundreds of others were facing.
Eichmann was stone, and both the infant and mother fell beneath the volley
of mortal fire. Eichmann could not say that he lacked the authority to exempt
that Jewish child. He found authority quickly enough to exempt a Jewish
relative from annihilation, and so testified in Jerusalem.
But Eichmann and the other Nazi defendants strenuously argued, through
their attorneys, that what they did was accomplished under the aegis of the
National Socialist regime of Germany and that they, of course, were bound
by the law of the realm. Strange as it may seem, however, the fact is that
even under Nazi law murder was illegal. The Nazis, of course, ignored the
law, but not one of the score of German lawyers before me in Nuremberg
was able to point to a German statute which authorized human slaughter.
In jurisprudential verity the German law actually invalidated the defense
of superior orders when the controverted act was shown to be a crime.
The Prussian Military Code, as far back as 1845, declared that a sub-
ordinate would be punished if he executed an order knowing that it "related
to an act which obviously aimed at a crime." This provision was copied into
the Military Penal Code of the Kingdom of Saxony in 1867 and of Baden
in 1870. Continuing and even extending the doctrine of conditional obe-
dience, the Bavarian Military Penal Code of 1869 went so far as to establish
the responsibility of the subordinate as the rule, and his irresponsibility as




Article 158. A subordinate who does not carry out an order is not
guilty of a violation of his duty of subordination if (a) the order is
obviously contrary to loyalty due to the Prince of the Land; (b) if
the order pertains to an act or omission in which evidently a crime
or an offense is to be recognized.
13
In 1872 Bismark attempted by legislation to limit subordinate responsi-
bility, but the Reichstag rejected his proposal and instead adopted the fol-
lowing as Article 47 of the German Military Penal Code:
If through the execution of an order pertaining to the service, a
penal law is violated, then the superior giving the order is alone
responsible. However, the obeying subordinate shall be punished as
accomplice (1) if he went beyond the order given to him, or (2) if
he knew that the order of the superior concerned an act which aimed
at civil or military crime or offense.
14
This law was never changed, except to broaden its scope by changing
the word "civil" to "general," and as late as 1940, one of the leading com-
mentators of the Nazi period, Professor Schwinge, wrote: "Hence, in military
life, just as in other fields, the principle of absolute, i.e., blind obedience does
not exist."' 5
It had been established by precedent in Germany even before the
Nuremberg trials, and of course prior to the Eichmann trial, that superior
orders is no defense in the wake of an unmistakably patent crime. In 1921
two officers of the German U-boat 68 were charged with violation of the
laws of war in that they fired at and killed unarmed enemy citizens seeking to
escape from the sinking hospital ship H.M.S. Llandovery Castle. The
defendants pleaded lack of guilt in that they had merely carried into effect
the order given them by their commander, First Lieutenant Patzig. The
German Supreme Court did find as a fact that Patzig ordered his sub-
ordinates Dithmar and Boldt to fire at the lifeboats, but it adjudicated them
guilty nonetheless, stating:
It is certainly to be urged in favor of the military subordinates,
that they are under no obligation to question the order of their
superior officer, and they can count upon its legality. But, no such
confidence can be held to exist, if such an order is universally known
to everybody, including also the accused, to be without any doubt
whatever against the law. This happens only in rare and exceptional
cases. But, this case was precisely one of them. For in the present
instance, it was perfectly clear to the accused that killing defense-
less people in the lifeboats could be nothing else but a breach of
law. As naval officers by profession they were well aware, as the
13. Op. cit. supra note 3, at 471.
14. Id. at 471-72.
15. Id. at 472.
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naval expert, Saalwaechter, has strikingly stated, that one is not
legally authorized to kill defenseless people. They quickly found
out the facts by questioning the occupants in the boats when these
were stopped. They could only have gathered, from the order given
by Patzig, that he wished to make use of his subordinates to carry
out a breach of law. They should, therefore, have refused to obey.
As they did not do so they must be punished.1"
The dedication of German officials to the maintenance of written records
is proverbial. No order, action, episode or incident in government can be
regarded too insignificant for recording and for depositing in the archives of
the nation. Following the surrender of Hitler's armies in Europe, the
Allies found, collected and categorized hundreds of tons of documents. It
is strange to the point of bizarreness that in all that documentation there
should not be found one copy of perhaps the most momentous order in the
whole history of Nazidom, the edict which directed the wiping out the lives
of millions of human beings.
The defendants in the Einsatzgruppen case testified in my court that
they never were served with a copy of the extermination order. The direc-
tions and instructions on how to kill the Jews were conveyed to them orally.
Where it became necessary, in any given situation, to direct the massacre
of Jews, the euphemism "special treatment" was used. Even the overall plan
for the wiping out of all Jews was referred to as "the solution of the Jewish
problem."
Why was this veiled nomenclature adopted? The reason is obvious. The
officials knew they were ordering and committing murder. Nothing perhaps
more conclusively establishes the awareness on the part of the designers, the
planners and the executants of the murder program of its criminality than
this reluctance to acknowledge in writing what was obviously a violation of
the criminal code of the nation, of international law and the law of humanity.
The Nuremberg and the Eichmann trials have now established authori-
tatively that superior orders is no defense when one is charged with commit-
ting a crime whose purpose he approved and in the illicit results of which he
eagerly participated. The world is improving. Attorney General Gideon
Hausner spoke well and conclusively when he said: "Individual responsibility
is the moral backbone of the law.'
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